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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
German marks payable in this country. The overwhelming mass of decisions
follows the rule, as set down in the above cases, that if the contract is pay-
able in foreign currency and in a foreign country the rate of exchange shall
be computed as of the date of judgment but, where the contract is payable
in foreign money in this country, the exchange shall be figured as of the
date of breach.4
Why should there be this distinction between the two types of cases?
In the Deutsche Bank case, Mr. Justice Holmes points out, "An obligation
in terms of the currency of a country takes the risk of currency fluctuations
and whether creditor or debtor profits by the change the law takes no
account of it. . . . Here we are lending our Courts to enforce an obligation
. . arising from German law alone and ought to enforce no greater obliga-
tion than exists by that law ... "', It is obvious that by converting the cur-
rency according to the rate of exchange existing at the time of the judgment
the plaintiff gets that for which lie bargained in the foreign currency. This
justifies the holding in the Deutsche Bank case, but why is there a differ-
ence when the contract is performable or payable in this country? The
Court points out in the Hicks case that when the contract is performable
here the plaintiff has the option, upon the breach by the defendant, to
demand damages in dollars and can no longer be compelled to accept foreign
currency.6 Thus the courts, by assuming the exercise of such option, con-
clude that the rate of exchange to be used in this type of case is that which
prevailed at the time of the breach.
The results reached in these cases would appear to be most equitable.
When the action arises wholly out of foreign law and our courts are lent
merely for the enforcement thereof, the injured party gets exactly what he
bargained for-or, to be more exact, its equivalent in American currency. On
the other hand, when the plaintiff's cause of action arises here in the United
States, lie receives his damages as of the date of breach.
CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - DISCOVERY - PRIVILEGE
AGAINST DISCLOSURE OF IDENTITY
Defendants, charged with conspiracy to violate the Smith Act,' moved
for issuance of a subpoena duces tecum directing the United States Attorney
4. Deutsche Bank Filiale Nurnberg v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517 (1926); Hicks
v. Guinness, 269 U.S. 71 (1925); 'Tiliman v. Russo Asiatic Bank, 51 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir.
1931); Det Forenede Dampskibs Selskab v. Ins. Co. of North America 31 F.2d 658 (2d
Cir. 1929); The Iltegritas, 3 F. Supp. 891 (D. Md. 1933); Royal Ins. Co. v. Com-
pania Trasatlantica Espafiola, 57 F.2d 288 (E.D. N.Y. 1932); The Muskegon, 10 F.2d
817 (S.D. N.Y. 1924j. The English view holds that in all cases the rate of exchange is
to be computed as of the date of breach, Socift6 des 1-1tels v. Cummings, [1921] 3
K.B. 459, rev'd on other grounds, [1922] 1 K.13. 451.
5. Deutsche Bank Filiale NuTnberg v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517, 519, 520 (1926).
6. Hicks v. Cuinness, 269 U.S. 71. 80 (1925).
I. 62 STAT. 808 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (Supp. 1951) (advocating and teaching
the duty and necessity of overthrowing the Government of the United States by force
and violence).
CASES NOTED
to produce all documents, books, papers and objects, obtained by counsel,
in any manner, other than by seizure or process. 2 The Government refused
to comply upon the ground that "compliance would be unreasonable" and
moved to modify the subpoena to provide "adequate safeguards ...to pro-
tect against disclosure of identity of the informants .... ." Held, public
policy forbids disclosure of informants' identities under the discovery pro-
vision 4 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. United States V.
Schneiderman, 104 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure5
it was doubtful if discovery existed in criminal cases.6 The courts, however,
did grant the defendant an opportunity to inspect impounded documents
belonging to him. 7 Rule 168 restates this procedure and in addition permits
discovery of objects and documents obtained from others by seizure or
process, on the theory that the evidential matter would have been available
to the defendant.9 But Rule 16, providing for pre-trial discovery, is dis-
cretionary10 and is the only rule providing for discovery."
In the instant case, the defendants sought to view reports and Commu-
nist Party membership cards which would reveal the identity of the inform-
ants.- 2 Generally, "public policy forbids disclosure of an informer's identity
unless essential to the defense."' 3  The privilege applies only to the identity
of the infornant, not to the information supplied.' In anti-trust actions,
however, both the informants' identities and the contents of their state-
2. Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214, 217 (1951); United States
v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 9 F.R.D. 509 (D. D.C. 1949).
3. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c) (provides for subpoena for the production of documen-
tary evidence, further providing that the court "may quash or modify the subpoena if
compliance would be unreasonable and oppressive.")
4. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
5. 54 STAr. 688 (1940), 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (Supp. 1951) as amended, 55 STAT. 779(1941), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771, 3772 (Supp. 1951) and 56 STAT. 271 (1942), 18 U.S.C.
§ 3731 (Supp. 1951).
6. Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1949); United States v. Rosen-
feld, 57 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied 286 U.S. 556 (1933); Rex v. Holland,
4 T.R. 691, 100 Eng. Reprint 1248 (1792). See Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules,
EDo. R. CnINI. P. 16, 18 U.S.C.A. at page 224; 6 WIMORE, EVInENCE § 1845 (3d Ed.
1940).
7. United States v. Goedde, 40 F.Supp. 523 (E.D. 11. 1941).
8, FED. R. CRit. P. 16 (provides for the discovery of "designated books, papers.
documents or tangible objects , . .upon a showing that the items sought may be material
to the preparation of his defense.")
9. See Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, FED. R. CRiti. P. 17(c), 18
U.S.C.A. at page 224; United States v. Black, 6 F.R.D. 270 (N.D. Ind. 1946) (limits
material that is subject to seizure under Rule 16 to material that was in existence prior
to the government's obtainment of it by process or service).
10. United States v. Schiller, 187 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1951).
11. See Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214, 220 (1951) ("Rule 17(c)
was not intended to provide an additional means of discovery").
12. 21 U.S.L. 'WeEK 2069 (Aug. 5, 1952).
13. Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 (1938); Sorrentino v. United States,
163 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1947); United States v. Li Fat Tong, 152 F.2d 650 (2d Cir.
1945); Wilson v. United States, 59 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1932); Smith v. United States, 9
F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1925).
14. 8 WiczioaE, EvIDENCE § 2374 (3d Ed. 1940).
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ments have been held privileged.'5 Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States,'6
relied on by this court, reaffirmed the general rule that all material admis-
sable as evidence, obtained by the Government through solicitation or
volunteered by third persons, is subject to subpoena, but the court should
be "solicitous to protect against disclosures of the identities of the inform-
ants.'' 7
Defendants contend that such confidential informants "promise to
become something more than mere informers." 1 They have testified before
the grand jury and will probably be called as witnesses at the trial. The
Government may finally elect not to use a given document rather than re-
veal the identity of an informant.' Writings not used at the trial but
which have been presented to the grand jury arc also protected from dis-
closure by a strong policy favoring secrecy of grand jury proceedings.20  Fur-
thermore, the denial of pre-trial inspection does not preclude further discov-
ery during the trial. 2'
Only persons charged with treason or other capital offenses can demand
as a matter of right a list of witnesses prior to the trial.22  The court can
take appropriate measures 31 to protect the rights of the defense in event of
undue surprise during the course of the trial. Defendants' discovery of re-
ports revealing the identity of informants would have afforded them a list
of the Government's witnesses. This list is not essential to the defense,
but would enable the Communist Party to police its ranks. The court
recognized this, and prevented the circumvention of an established principle
of law, by defendants' use of a procedural rule.
CRIMINAL LAW - TRIAL - INSTRUCTION AS TO THE
POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE AS REVERSIBLE ERROR
The jury requested the court to advise them as to the probability of
the defendant serving a full life sentence without parole, if they returned a
15. United States v. Deere & Co., 9 F.R.I. 523 (Minn. 1949); United States v.
Kohler, 9 F.R.D. 289 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
16. 341 U.S. 214 (1951).
17. Ibid at 221.
18. Sorrentino v. United States, 163 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1947); Wilson v. United
States, 59 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1932).
19. United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 638-639 (2d Cir. 1950); United States
v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1944); United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d
503, 506 (2d Cir. 1944).
20. Goodman v. United States, 108 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1939); Metzler v. United
States, 64 F.2d 203 (9th Cir. 1933); United States v. Amazon Industrial Chemical Corp.,
55 F.2d 254, 261 (D. Md. 1931).
21. Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838, 844 (8th Cir. 1949); United States v.
Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76, 78 (2d Cir. 1944), '
22. 62 STAT. 831 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (Supp. 1951).
23. Rubio v. United States, 22 F.2d 766, 768 (9th Cir. 1927), cert. denied 276 U.S.
619 (1928) (The court had power to grant a continuance or a new trial upon a proper
showing that the defendant's rights were not safeguarded because of surprise).
